Strategic Offering to Maximise Day-Ahaed Profit by Hedging against an Infeasible Market Clearing Result by Maenhoudt, Marijn & Deconinck, Geert
854 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 29, NO. 2, MARCH 2014
Strategic Offering to Maximize Day-Ahead
Profit by Hedging Against an Infeasible
Market Clearing Result
Marijn Maenhoudt, Student Member, IEEE, and Geert Deconinck, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a profit-maximizing offering
strategy for a price taker power producer participating in the
day-ahead spot market as organized under the Power Exchange
model. The offering strategy maximizes profit by mitigating profit
risk due to price forecast uncertainty leading to an imbalance
arising from being accepted by the market operator (MO) to
produce an infeasible dispatch schedule. The strategy makes use
of a price forecast confidence interval to build hourly offer curves.
The offering strategy is applied to realistic price scenarios as
obtained from the Iberian MO. The performance is compared to
alternative offering strategies using the agent-based OPTIMATE
simulator. Results indicate that the offering strategy increases
profit, reduces profit risk and reduces balancing costs arising from
differences between the accepted and actual dispatch schedule.
Consequently, the presented strategy outperforms the literature
benchmark strategy in 83% of the cases.
Index Terms—Bidding strategy, competitive, day-ahead, dereg-
ulation, electricity market, liberalization, offering strategy, price
taker, profit risk management, spot market.
NOMENCLATURE
Index of a market round in the market session
[hour].
Index of a price scenario to calculate the optimal
dispatch schedule .
Forecast price, in market round , according to
scenario [ ].
Optimal production in market round , calculated
from price scenario [MW].
Total fixed and variable cost incurred in market
round when producing .
Minimum quantity to supply if the MO accepts the
offer in market round [MW].
Maximum quantity to supply if the MO accepts the
offer in market round [MW].
Offer price [ ].
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Starting market round for which the offer is valid
[hour].
Ending market round for which the offer is valid
[hour].
Incurred fixed costs when operating according to
price forecast scenario .
Variable production cost for operating at
[ ].
“Fixed cost recovery” offer price when producing
according to price scenario , in market round
[ ].
Maximum (minimum) stable power output level of
the plant [MW].
Minimum duration, after start-up, at which the plant
can be shut down [hour].
Incurred fixed cost in case the plant produces
according to .
Averaged upward (downward) gradient of the
start-up (shut-down) power trajectory [MW/h].
Minimum stable power output duration before
ramping up (down) [hour].
Start-up cost of the plant .
Emerging market clearing price [ ].
Accepted production level by the MO, in market
round [MW].
Least-cost production level, in market round ,
calculated after the market clearing process [MW].
Ideal production level, in market round , calculated
based on the emerging market clearing prices
[MW].
I. INTRODUCTION
P OWER producers participating in the hourly-organizedelectricity spot market face two difficult problems. They
need to decide the optimal next-day dispatch schedule of their
portfolio and they need to determine offers so that this optimal
dispatch schedule is accepted by the market operator (MO)
which operates according to the rules of the Power Exchange.
As is currently the case in European day-ahead electricity
0885-8950 © 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
MAENHOUDT AND DECONINCK: STRATEGIC OFFERING TO MAXIMIZE DAY-AHEAD PROFIT 855
markets, power producers need to submit these decisions for
each market round of the next-day market session.
Maximizing profit day-ahead of delivery exposes power pro-
ducers to risk resulting from: 1) limited access to delayed in-
formation, 2) demand forecast uncertainty, 3) competitors’ be-
havior, 4) renewable energy sources’ production levels, 5) un-
expected events such as forced thermal power plant or trans-
mission line outages, 6) the impact of previously made deci-
sions in terms of bilateral contracts or long-term obligations to-
wards large customers, 7) the impact of concurrently organized
auctions (e.g., ancillary services) or future ones (e.g., balancing
markets), 8) operating constraints inherent to each type of pro-
duction plant and 9) transmission constraints. All these uncer-
tainties affect the actual emerging market clearing price in each
market round. Short-term (i.e., next-day) price predictions typ-
ically exhibit white-noise errors ranging from 5% to 12%, se-
verely harming the profit of the power producer if its response
to above-mentioned problems does not adequately account for
the price uncertainty range [1], [2].
The problem of determining the optimal portfolio dispatch
schedule from the perspective of a price-taker power producer
is handled by stochastic unit commitment (UC) and economic
dispatch (ED) models [3]–[10]. Two broad categories are identi-
fied when representing profit risk: either a risk factor is included
in the profit-based UC objective function, or the expected profit
is maximized given a set of probable price scenarios or confi-
dence intervals.
The variance of the expected profit was integrated in the ex-
pected profit maximization objective function to represent profit
risk in [11]. A risk tolerance parameter determined the risk level
the power producer was willing to expose itself to. A similar
method was proposed by [12] to take ancillary services into
account. The performance of both methods is proved highly
sensitive to the value of the risk tolerance parameter. Alterna-
tively, [13] proposes conditional value at risk (CVAR) to ob-
tain less sensitive results. In return, this method produces more
conservative solutions and is therefore more suited to manage
longer-term market risks. As profit uncertainty is explicitly and
directly integrated in the objective function of the UC and ED
problem formulation, the optimal expected portfolio production
schedule is obtained.
Instead of specifying a risk factor in the objective function,
short-term price volatility is managed by defining price sce-
nario trees. Such stochastic optimization technique has been
combined with the real options model in [14], while more re-
cently [15] linked it with the above-mentioned CVAR method
to determine a trade-off between allocating power production
to weekly forward contracts and the short-term day-ahead spot
market. Similarly, Monte Carlo simulation has been applied to
tackle the problem in [16]. Due to the computational intensivity
of the method, a trade-off is required between the amount of
generated price scenarios and the accurate representation of the
technical constraints in the self-scheduling problem. To reduce
computational complexity, price scenarios can be confined to
confidence intervals [7], [17], or alternative solution techniques,
such as fuzzy logic [18], [19], genetic algorithms (GAs) [20] and
control theory [21] can be used. The performance of the latter
approaches has been found sensitive to the choice of parameters.
Although all methods provide a formal framework to maxi-
mize expected profit in the presence of profit risk, the effect of
the market clearing process on profit is not taken into account as
long as the optimal dispatch schedule is not complemented by
a coherent strategy to translate the optimal dispatch schedule
into offer curves. The determination of offer curves from the
price taker power producer’s perspective has received limited
interest in literature, compared to the high academic interest in
developing an anti-competitive offering strategy. Since the elec-
tricity market structure resembles more to an oligopoly than a
perfect competitive market, this is understandable. Neverthe-
less, the development of a rational price taker profit-maximizing
offering strategy, in which the power producer does not believe
its offering strategy to affect the market clearing price outcome,
is important in case such behavior is considered a benchmark to
strategic market participants’ behavior. This is especially true
when researching the adequacy of an electricity market struc-
ture and management mechanisms or rules to direct the opera-
tion of the market towards maximal social welfare [22].
Besides offering the optimal dispatch schedule at a single
fixed price, mostly equaling the marginal production cost
[23]–[27], literature proposes few alternative offering strategies
tailored to the needs of a competitive power producer. To
the authors’ knowledge, the majority of alternative strategies
require perfect knowledge of the price distribution function,
are computationally intensive due to the need of many price
forecast scenarios, create smooth or piece-wise hourly offer
curves, and/or create offers which do not reflect the actual
cost of dispatching the portfolio. Consequently, these offering
strategies cannot be generalized to be applied in real power
markets [28]–[30]. On the other hand, the literature benchmark
of offering the optimal dispatch schedule at marginal cost is
argued not to be the norm for competitive offering [31].
Without an offering strategy which represents the flexibility
of the portfolio, imbalances between the optimal and accepted
dispatch schedule might arise due to unforeseen price devia-
tions. Consequently, the power producer is either contractually
obliged to supply at a loss, must balance its accepted position
using secondary markets, or suffers an opportunity cost in the
face of profitable market clearing prices. Also known as the
Winner’s Curse, this effect is persistent over time and leads to a
reduction in total profit and thus an increase in total profit risk
[32]. Consequently, the authors argue the importance of devel-
oping an offering strategy to take into account arising imbal-
ances caused by the market clearing process, in order not only
to maximize day-ahead profit, but also to address costs related
to future self-balancing requirements.
This paper highlights the impact of a flexible offering strategy
on profit risk and balancing requirements. Three contributions
are distinguished:
1) A novel risk hedging offering strategy for a price taker
power producer is presented. The offering strategy aims to
increase market session’s profit by representing the tech-
nical flexibility of the portfolio in its offers. It is found to
reduce risk, to increase profit and to mitigate exposure to
future imbalances due to differences between the accepted
and actual dispatch schedule.
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2) The offering strategy is robust. Results show that the accu-
rate representation of plant economics and physical con-
straints allows the strategy to perform well, even when the
emergingmarket clearing price distribution is not fully rep-
resented by the price forecast tool. Additionally, good re-
sults are achieved with a low number of price scenarios,
compared to alternative methods.
3) Two alternative offering strategies are applied as well in
order to quantitively assess improvements in profit and bal-
ancing requirements. The optimality analysis focuses on
how the offering strategy fares to obtain the maximum pos-
sible profit and therefore it allows the deduction of rele-
vant, objective conclusions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents the price taker offering strategy. The proposed method
is applied to a realistic case study in Section IV and the results
are analyzed. Finally, Section V briefly formulates conclusions
and discusses relevant future work.
II. RISK-CONSTRAINED OFFERING STRATEGY
The offering strategy assumes the availability of optimal dis-
patch schedules spanning the next-day market session, as ob-
tained from a price-based UC and ED problem formulation of
which the general form is given in (1). Technical and economic
constraints are represented using the short-hand notation ,
, and . The problem formulation optimizes the
price taker power producer’s profit on a portfolio level, given
price forecast scenario , in order to obtain each plant’s op-
timal dispatch schedule , to be sold in each market round
. Since this paper focuses on creating optimal offers from the
UC and ED scheduling solutions, any self-scheduling problem
formulation which accurately represents the economic and tech-
nical constraints of thermal power plants suffices [33]–[36]:
to
(1)
The optimal production levels are calculated from price
forecast scenarios. Each price forecast scenario is derived
from the price forecast distribution in market round , by con-
necting all hourly prices corresponding to the same percentile
of each price forecast distribution. Consequently, dispatch
schedules are calculated, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 in case
three price forecast scenarios corresponding to the 5%, 50% and
95% percentile are selected. Note that is always strictly
larger than .
Comparing the dispatch schedules of two subsequent price
scenarios and in market round , two situations can
occur: either or . The first
situation does not require hourly offers to be created to deal with
price uncertainty between price scenarios and since no
additional quantity is supplied to the market, and therefore no
profit risk is associated with the price difference in market round
. Consequently, it suffices only to discuss the second situation.
Fig. 1. Price forecast uncertainty in the Iberian electricity market on the 12th
of March 2008.
Fig. 2. Example of the optimal scheduling solutions for each price scenarios.
Note that the situation does not emerge, since
all hourly prices are larger in price scenario compared to
price scenario . Consequently, any solution
will result in a lower profit for the price taker power producer
than if it would have pursued .
To aid readability, the formal representation of the offer is de-
noted in the following form, in which corresponds to the
indivisible part of the offer which at least needs to be supplied
when the market operator (MO) accepts the offer and
equals to the maximum quantity offered at offer price .
Since only hourly offers are created, equals :
The optimal dispatch schedule proposes the power producer
to supply the market with at price . Consequently,
poses an upper bound on the price needed by the price
taker power producer to produce. As such, the offer price as-
sociated with cannot be larger than , even if this
offer price causes the price taker power producer to produce at
a loss during market round . In fact, as the dispatch schedule
is optimal, limiting the offer price to keeps the likelihood
of this hourly loss being compensated in following, more prof-
itable market rounds, consistent with the likelihood of emerging
prices to exceed the ones denoted by the price scenario. Conse-
quently, the likelihood of being rejected by the MO in market
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round , which in turn results in an infeasible accepted dispatch
schedule, is reduced.
In case supplying the market is profitable during market
round , the power producer will pursue a “fixed cost recovery”
pricing scheme, whose objective is to generate sufficient rev-
enue throughout the whole market session in order to cover the
total variable and fixed costs incurred by producing according
to the optimal dispatch schedule. Note that losses incurred by
producing during unprofitable market rounds are included in
this price mark-up.
Increasing hourly offer prices increases the likelihood of the
offer being rejected. This risk is ideally kept as small as possible
over all profitable market rounds. The total cost to be recovered,
excluding variable production costs, is therefore distributed pro-
portionally to the yield between the price forecast associated
with scenario and the variable production cost. The following
equation is solved to obtain the proportion , which is then used
to calculate the “fixed cost recovery” offer price in each
individual profitable market round by adding the “fixed cost
recovery” price mark-up to the marginal production cost. Note
that the “fixed cost recovery” offer price in unprofitable market
rounds is consistent with price forecast scenario and equals
:
Consequently, the offer submitted to supply to the
market is represented by (2) in case and by (3)
otherwise. As such, the start-up and the shut-down trajectories
are explicitly represented by the offer, as well as the minimum
stable power output level:
(2)
(3)
The price taker power producer also has an incentive to pro-
duce up to in case the price reaches . Conse-
quently, poses an upper bound on the price needed by
the price taker power producer to produce the additional quan-
tity . The price taker power producer must offer
this quantity at an offer price strictly larger than in order
to (1) guarantee the acceptance of all previous offers prior to the
acceptance of the offer to produce up to , and (2) not to
produce at price .
All total variable and fixed costs incurred for producing the
optimal dispatch schedule are recovered in a similar
manner as the “fixed cost recovery” pricing scheme described
previously. Analogously, the final “fixed cost recovery” offer
price , associated to price scenario and market
round , is limited to to keep the likelihood of being
accepted consistent with the likelihood of emerging prices to
exceed the values denoted by price scenario .
Finally, the price taker power producer submits (4) in case
in order to comply to start-up or shut-down tra-
jectories, (5) in case but , and (6) in
case :
(4)
(5)
(6)
Above-mentioned offers are submitted for each price sce-
nario, each market round and each thermal plant in the portfolio.
As such, the offering strategy is iterated times per
plant. In order to avoid offer duplicates, quantity is only
offered once.
All market participants are obliged to submit the whole avail-
able capacity of their production portfolio to the MO. In case
a plant has not been dispatched at full capacity according to
the optimal dispatch schedule , the remaining capacity
still needs to be offered. The price at which to
offer the remaining capacity is bounded downward by .
Although no upper bound exists except for the market ceiling
price, a price taker power producer only has an incentive to mar-
ginally increase its offer price beyond . Consequently, in
case because of compliance to start-up or
shut-down power trajectories, the offer is represented by (7). In
case , it is described by (8):
(7)
(8)
The previous process is iteratively continued until all price
scenarios and all market rounds in the market session have been
addressed. Finally, the created offers are aggregated to form an
offer curve which is submitted to the MO. The whole process is
illustrated schematically in Fig. 3.
In case , the plant is assumed not to be dispatched.
However, in order to comply to the obligation to submit the
whole capacity, offer (9) is created. Note that the “fixed cost
recovery” offer price includes the minimum operational time
after start-up and the start-up costs:
(9)
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The following numerical example facilitates the comprehen-
sion of the method. Consider a power plant with variable cost
and start-up cost equal to . Also consider the
plant to operate between 5 MW and 20 MW. The ramping rate
is 5MW/h, while the gradient during the start-up and shut-down
trajectories equal 2.5 MW/h. Assume a single market round in
the market session of which the scheduling problem solution is
given in Table I for each scenario.
The first scenario does not advise a dispatch of the plant.
Consequently, no offer is created to account for this scenario.
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Fig. 3. Flow chart of the offering strategy.
TABLE I
THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO PARAMETERS
TABLE II
THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO PARAMETERS
The second scenario dispatches the plant at a level lower than
the minimum stable power output level which indicates the
plant is following its start-up trajectory throughout the envis-
aged market round. Since no former offer has been submitted
and the calculated “fixed cost recovery” offer price is larger
than the anticipated market clearing price, the optimal dispatch
schedule is submitted at . Consequently, the first
offer in Table II is created.
The third scenario does not indicate an increase of optimal
power production level during the market round. No additional
offer is therefore created. The fourth scenario reaches the min-
imum stable production power output level at a “fixed cost re-
covery” offer price equal to . Since this price does
not violate the price limits between which the scenario is valid,
i.e., and , this price level is the most
competitive one at which the offer can be priced.
The fifth scenario increases the production output level to 10
MW. Since the plant is now operating between its minimum
and maximum stable power production limits, no indivisible
part is defined. The “fixed cost recovery” offer price is however
smaller than the anticipated price of the previous scenario, so
that this offer is priced at a marginally higher level than the max-
imum anticipated price of the former scenario. Lastly, the re-
maining capacity of the plant is fully divisibly offered at a mar-
ginally higher price than the anticipated price according to the
last price scenario. The full offer curve is presented in Table II.
In both cases, the marginal increase equals .
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Simulation Platform
In order to test the performance of the presented offering
strategy, the prototype of the agent-based OPTIMATE simulator
is used. The OPTIMATE simulator is a numerical test platform
created for the analysis of actual market designs and validation
of new ones which may allow integrating massive intermittent
generation dispersed in several regional power markets [37].
OPTIMATE will therefore contribute to the construction of a
pan-European electricity market adapted to climate policy and
security of supply concerns. The OPTIMATE platform is unique
since it intends to replicate the sequence of electricity markets.
The simulator is implemented using the C++ programming lan-
guage and is currently commercially available in its sequential
computational form [38].
The agent-based OPTIMATE simulator adds a layer of com-
plexity in order to model the interaction between market partic-
ipants (generators, consumers, portfolio managers, renewable,
TSOs, etc.) more realistically. The agent-based simulator covers
the operation of the day-ahead spot market. Individual market
participants owning a portfolio ranging from renewable to hydro
and thermal plants can be represented. Each market participant
decides its optimal offer curve without knowledge of competi-
tors’ actions, but according to their forecast of the residual de-
mand curves based on historic data published by the MO. The
market participants schedule their portfolio and create offers
to submit to the MO. The market clearing mechanism realis-
tically mimics the process as currently instated to clear the elec-
tricity markets in the CWE region. The MO then communi-
cates the accepted dispatch schedules back to the market partic-
ipants. The market participants finally reschedule their portfolio
in order to minimize the cost while producing the accepted dis-
patch schedule.
Since the presented offering strategy aims at maximizing
profit while maintaining balancing responsibilities after the
day-ahead market clearing process due to accepted dispatch
schedule infeasibility, the agent-based OPTIMATE simulator
prototype is suited as simulation platform.
In this paper, a single power producer is envisaged, facing a
flat residual demand curve. Its portfolio consists of 6 thermal
plant types, ranging from base power to peak power plants. The
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TABLE III
THERMAL GENERATION PORTFOLIO PARAMETERS
total number of plants and relevant parameters per plant type
are illustrated in Table III. Market participants are assumed to
use the UC and ED mixed-integer linear problem (MILP) for-
mulation as presented in [8] to maximize profit based on price
forecasts, as well as to minimize production costs when con-
tractually obliged to produce the accepted dispatch schedule.
The problem formulation consists of 36 variable groups and 72
constraint groups for a single market session. For the envisaged
portfolio, this leads to a model containing 44 034 discrete vari-
ables, 52 129 continuous variables and 451 723 constraints. The
problem to create the offers is solved in 4.7 min per price fore-
cast scenario, using the GLPK solver in C++ [39], on a machine
with a 2.83-GHz processor and 3.84 GB of RAM memory.
Note that this paper focuses on accurately representing the
optimal dispatch schedule to be submitted to the MO operating
the day-ahead spot market. Alternative UC and ED models than
the one used for this case study can be applied as well, e.g.,
models integrating energy supply to AGC, spinning and non-
spinning reserve markets [40], [41]. Although the choice of the
model will affect the optimal dispatch schedule to be offered
in the day-ahead spot market, the conclusions of this paper are
not affected. Since all optimal dispatch schedules are calcu-
lated based on the same MILP model, the performance of each
strategy is solely dependent on the used offering strategy.
B. Simulation Setup and Data Generation
The simulation setup is retrieved from the Iberian electricity
market as emerged on the 12th ofMarch 2008 [42]. In this setup,
a market participant has to submit offers to the MO, facing
a real price uncertainty as illustrated in Fig. 4. The full black
line denotes the actual emerging market clearing price on that
day. The price uncertainty is calculated based on the emerging
market clearing prices from January 2008 to the 11th of March
2008 as available on the website of the Iberian MO [43]. The
real distribution of hourly prices is assumed unknown, how-
ever, the power producer is assumed to have available a price
forecast tool which predicts hourly next-day prices by means of
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) techniques
(Fig. 1). Although the price forecast tool is able to approach the
real price uncertainty during the market session, discrepancies
arise during individual market rounds, allowing the emerging
market clearing price to significantly differ from the predicted
price.
In order to assess the performance and robustness of the of-
fering strategy, 100 emerging market clearing price outcomes
have been created by calculating the covariance matrix between
the 24 hourly price distributions as presented in Fig. 4. The of-
fers are created according to the price forecast distribution pre-
sented in Fig. 1. Consequently, 100 market sessions are simu-
Fig. 4. Price uncertainty in the Iberian electricity market as calculated from
January to March 2008.
lated in which an identical set of offers is cleared by the MO ac-
cording to different market clearing price outcomes. One such
emerging price outcome is highlighted in Fig. 4. As such, the
performance and robustness of the offering strategy is statis-
tically assessed given an imperfectly known price distribution
and a variety of plant types.
Two alternative offering strategies are implemented in order
to better situate the performance of the presented offering
strategy. The “literature benchmark” strategy offers the op-
timal expected dispatch schedule of each plant at its marginal
production cost, similar to the strategy used in most literature.
The “robust optimization” strategy is retrieved from [17]. It
constructs an offer curve by offering an increase in production
level in market round at the hourly price denoted by the price
scenario. Price scenarios are obtained by decreasing all hourly
prices from the maximum envisaged price scenario down to the
minimum envisaged price scenario.
C. Results
Two key performance indicators have been identified to ob-
jectively assess the performance of the strategy.
Firstly, the obtained profit is benchmarked to the maximum
attainable profit each market session. The obtained profit is
calculated by subtracting the cost for producing the actual
dispatch schedule from the revenue. Revenue is calculated
by multiplying the emerging market clearing price with the
minimum of the accepted and the actual production output
level. The maximum profit is obtained by calculating the op-
timal dispatch schedule under perfect knowledge of the market
clearing prices. This corresponds to (10):
(10)
Fig. 5 illustrates the distribution of the performance to attain
maximum profit in terms of the followed offering strategy. The
“literature benchmark” strategy (LB) only offers according to
the price scenario of the price forecast distribution at the 50%
percentile, while the “Presented” (P) and “Robust” (R) strategy
make use of more price scenarios as illustrated by the number
in brackets. All strategies divide the 90% confidence interval
of the price forecast distribution uniformly in smaller intervals.
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Fig. 5. Comparative assessment of the performance of each strategy to obtain
maximum profit after the market clearing mechanism.
The data is plotted in boxplot format in order to visually observe
the expected value and the uncertainty.
The presented offering strategy outperforms all other strate-
gies in terms of attaining maximum profit. All presented of-
fering strategies achieve on average 91.2% to 91.9% of the max-
imum attainable profit, while this number equals 86.2% for the
benchmark strategy and 79.6% to 81.2% for the robust strategy.
Although the profit increase averages out on five percentage
point compared to the benchmark case, the absolute profit in-
creases 6.1% on average.
A beneficial effect on profit risk is also observed. Using the
presented strategy, in 90% of the cases, at least 80.3% of the
maximum profit is obtained, while this number drops to 68.3%
and 44.4% compared to the benchmark and robust strategy. It is
also observed that good results are already obtained when using
the lowest amount of price scenarios to create the offers.
This case study therefore shows that profit is increased, and
profit risk reduced, by representing the flexibility of the portfolio
through the offers. The offering strategy attains more than 90%
of the maximum profit using the lowest number of price sce-
narios or price quantiles. The performance only increases 0.7%
in case the number of price scenarios is doubled, illustrating the
method’s robustness and computational efficiency, even in case
the actual price distribution is not perfectly represented by the
forecast price distribution. Since the number of price scenarios
is the method’s sole user-defined input parameter, the method is
argued to illustrate a lower sensitivity to input parameters com-
pared to alternative methods. Consequently, even though a price
taker power producer does not have the market power to alter
the market clearing price to its own advantage, deviating the
offer price away from the marginal production costs is a rational
strategy to hedge against profit risk.
Secondly, the change in obtained profit between two offering
strategies is compared to the change in total daily imbalance
between the accepted and produced dispatch schedules. This
indicator allows the deduction of relevant conclusion on how
the offering strategy impacts the balancing cost. Four possible
outcomes can be observed. In case the profit increases while
imbalances increase, the cost related to the increase in balance
should be offset by the increase in day-ahead profit. As such, the
metric serves as an upper bound for the balancing costs below
Fig. 6. Relationship between profit and imbalance of the presented strategy
when compared to the literature benchmark strategy.
which it is justified to make use of the offering strategy. Simi-
larly, a lower bound of balancing costs is obtained when profit
and imbalances both decrease. An increase in profit and a de-
crease in imbalance illustrates the superiority of the analyzed
offering strategy, while a decrease in profit and an increase in
imbalances shows the inferiority of the strategy. The “literature
benchmark” strategy is chosen to be the benchmark strategy for
this indicator. The imbalance is calculated using (11):
(11)
Fig. 6 illustrates the result in case the performance of the pre-
sented strategy using 7 price scenarios is compared to that of the
benchmark strategy. In 54 cases, a larger profit was achieved at a
lower imbalance, illustrating the capability of the presented of-
fering strategy to increase profit while decreasing imbalances.
On the other hand, 7 cases illustrate a better performance of the
benchmark offering strategy. The remainder of cases obtain a
higher profit, but also incur a larger imbalance. The additional
obtained day-ahead profit per unit of imbalance is only prof-
itable if the actual self-balancing costs are lower. An imbalance
cost of is drawn on the figure to illustrate that, in
most cases, the additional profit outweighs the cost for balancing
when using the presented offering strategy.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the actual, optimal and accepted
dispatch schedules for the market session in which the pre-
sented offering strategy achieves its highest loss and imbalance
compared to the benchmark offering strategy. The presented
offering strategy closely follows the optimal dispatch schedule
during market rounds 9 to 24 thanks to the “fixed cost recovery”
pricing scheme. Additionally, it can be observed that the op-
timal dispatched schedule is closely followed by the accepted
dispatched schedule during market rounds 3 to 7 as well.
Therefore, the strategy is more profitable than the benchmark
strategy during these market rounds. However, the performance
of the strategy during the first and the eighth market round
is worse than that of the benchmark strategy. During the first
market round, the emerging price equals . Con-
sequently, the benchmark strategy succeeds to be accepted for
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Fig. 7. Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing the
benchmark offering strategy, during the best performing market session
compared to the presented strategy.
Fig. 8. Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing the pre-
sented offering strategy using 7 price scenarios, during the worst performing
market session compared to the benchmark strategy.
all its base power plant capacity, while the presented offering
strategy is only accepted for its first plant type capacity, since
the “fixed cost recovery” offer price associated with the second
plant type capacity equals . In market round
eighth, the emerging price equals , a jump of
compared to the emerging price in market
round 7. It can be observed that both the benchmark and pre-
sented offering strategy do not cope well with the sudden price
increase, however, the “fixed cost recovery” pricing scheme
exacerbates this effect.
The effect is also illustrated in Fig. 9, which represents the
offer curve created by each offering strategy subject to a price
forecast of . The offer prices of the presented
strategy are increased for all base power plants in order to
account for fixed costs, while a mark-down is visible for the
peak power plant since the self-scheduling solution dictates
the plant to ramp up in order to profit from subsequent, more
profitable market rounds. Combining the rejection of all mid
type power plants in market round 7 with the acceptation of all
mid type and one peak type power plant in market round 8, the
presented offering strategy suffers a larger imbalance than the
benchmark strategy.
Note however that an inter-hourly price increase of 37% is not
practically common in realistic electricity markets. Also note
Fig. 9. Offer curves for each strategy, as submitted for hour 8, during the
benchmark strategy’s best performing market session compared to the pre-
sented strategy.
in Fig. 6 that, although the imbalance is large, the day-ahead
loss is limited. It is thus concluded that the presented offering
strategy generally outperforms the benchmark offering strategy
while hedging profit risk.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel price taker offering strategy to
maximize profit while accounting for imbalances arising from
being accepted by the MO to produce an infeasible dispatch
schedule. The offers created by the strategy take into account
technical constraints and plant economics. The strategy has been
applied to a realistic case study inspired on the Iberian elec-
tricity market, using the prototype of the agent-based OPTI-
MATE simulator. The offering strategy does not require a de-
tailed representation of the price forecast distribution and is
proved largely insensitive to the number of user-specified price
forecast scenarios. The offering strategy also produces step-
wise offer curves at a low computational cost, which render it
practically applicable.
Comparing the offering strategy to alternative strategies
shows that profit is increased by 6.1% and that the offering
strategy obtains at least 80.3% of the maximum attainable profit
in 90% of the cases. Although imbalances are reduced in 54%
of the cases compared to the benchmark strategy, the offering
strategy outperforms the benchmark strategy in 83% of the
cases. Consequently, it is argued that the literature benchmark
strategy does not reflect rational behavior of a price taker power
producer.
However, it is also noted that the performance of the pre-
sented hourly offering strategy drops in an electricity market
with high price volatility between neighboring market rounds or
in case self-balancing costs are high. Therefore, future work will
include multi-hourly price-quota pairs to handle such volatility
and uncertainty.
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